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Resource curseA large body of econometric research has generated growing support for the existence of a political
resource curse, but has nonetheless continued to be regularly punctuated by research contesting those
conclusions. This continuing disagreement can be explained in significant part by problems associated
with low-quality government revenue data: it has undermined the robustness of many existing findings,
while leading other researchers to rely on alternative measures of resource income as their primary
explanatory variable – a highly imperfect measures of the underlying relationship of interest. We re-
examine the relationship between taxation, non-tax revenue and democracy by employing dramatically
improved data developed specifically for this research. We find the strongest evidence to date of a polit-
ical resource curse, and provide evidence about the specific details of the underlying relationship: (i) nat-
ural resource wealth is anti-democratic, rather than merely stabilizing; (ii) it is driven primarily by
changes in the composition of government revenue; (iii) it is best understood as a long-term relationship,
rather than short-term changes in resource wealth being quickly translated into major political changes;
and (iv) it is driven primarily by oil wealth, rather than mineral wealth, because governments are com-
paratively effective at translating oil wealth into the government revenues that drive the political
resource curse.
 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Most research into thepolitical resource curseproposes that gov-
ernments that rely more heavily on revenue from non-renewable
natural resources1, and which are less reliant on national taxation,
are less likely to be democratic and accountable to their citizens.
Building on this research, resource dependence has become a promi-
nent feature of accounts in political science and economics about the
long-term drivers of state building, institutional change and democ-
racy. This argument has been based largely on cross-country econo-
metric studies, which have proliferated over the past 15 years, with
most cross-country econometric research reporting the expected neg-
ative relationship between natural resource wealth and democracy.
However, among the studies investigating ‘‘whether the
resource curse is real or illusory”, a significant group have contin-ued to contest these results (Ross, 2015: 240). Some have argued
that findings of a political resource curse are simply not robust
(Haber & Menaldo, 2011). Meanwhile, recent work by Morrison
(2009, 2015) – building on earlier work by Smith (2004) – has pro-
posed an alternative interpretation: that natural resource wealth,
and non-tax revenue more generally, is not anti-democratic, but
tends to stabilize democracies and non-democracies alike, while
taxation has the opposite effect. This divergence within existing
results is puzzling: Why have multiple researchers, asking a con-
sistent and well-defined research question, over almost two dec-
ades, failed to arrive at more consistent findings?
In this paper we argue that a significant part of existing dis-
agreement can be explained by a combination of low quality data
and correspondingly mis-specified tests of the relationship of
interest. We demonstrate that after correcting for these two prob-
lems there is far more consistent and persuasive evidence of the
existence of the political resource curse.2 Furthermore, we are ablePrichard
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debated in the literature. First, that the effects of natural resource
revenues are anti-democratic, rather than merely stabilizing. Second,
that the political resource curse is driven by changes in the composi-
tion of government revenue, rather than alternative mechanisms link-
ing resource extraction more broadly to reduced democracy. This is
important in its own right, and helps to explain recent evidence that
the political resource curse is driven primarily by oil wealth rather
than mineral wealth (Ross, 2012): oil wealth tends to be much more
effectively translated into expanded government revenue. Third, that
the political resource curse is best understood as a long-term rela-
tionship, rather than one in which levels of democracy are highly
sensitive to short term fluctuations in resource revenues (Ross,
2015).
The starting point for our analysis is a return to the theory
underpinning the political resource curse. The most compelling
and commonly cited version of the political resource curse hypoth-
esis focuses on the impact of changes in the composition of govern-
ment revenue on political outcomes.3 Stated most broadly,
government reliance on non-tax revenue – that is, government rev-
enue from comparatively captive sources, and primarily (but not
exclusively) from non-renewable natural resources4 – is expected
to reduce democracy and accountability by weakening state-
society links, facilitating government investments in patronage and
repression, and driving expanded political corruption (Ross, 2001).
Meanwhile, reliance on tax revenue – that is, revenue raised from
relatively broad-based taxes on individual taxpayers and businesses
– may have a conversely positive impact on governance by providing
the state with stronger incentives to ‘‘bargain” with their citizens
over how public revenue is used and the broader extent of political
representation (Moore, 1998; Prichard, 2015).
However, owing to data limitations there has yet to be a study
that convincingly and directly tests the relationship between the
composition of government revenue and democracy. A handful of
studies have set out to test this relationship directly, but have been
undermined by severely inadequate government revenue data
(Ross, 2004; Mahon, 2005; Morrison, 2009, 2015). This data, pri-
marily from the IMF and World Bank, has suffered from extensive
missing observations and has failed to distinguish effectively
between tax and nontax revenues. Owing to these data limitations,
most studies of the political resource curse have instead tested the
relationship between resource income5 and democracy. However,
while this is an intuitive proxy for changes in the composition of
government revenue, it is highly imperfect, and thus fails to pre-
cisely test the key mechanism underpinning the most persuasive
version of the resource curse hypothesis (Wiens, Poast & Clark,
2014).
In what follows we address these longstanding problems by
drawing on dramatically improved data from the ICTD Govern-
ment Revenue Dataset (GRD), which was constructed explicitly,
though not exclusively, for this project (Prichard, Cobham, &
Goodall, 2014).6 These improved data are pivotal. Table 1 lists the3 Natural resource wealth – and oil wealth in particular - may also affect
democracy through alternative channels, detailed most completely in Ross (2012).
However, our contention is that revenue related channels are the primary mecha-
nisms linking resource wealth to autocracy.
4 As described in detail later, this definition is rooted in the political economy
literature, and differs from a purely accounting definition.
5 Defined as the total annual value of resource production, either per capita or as a
share of GDP.
6 We employ the May 2016 version of the data, available at http://www.ictd.
ac/datasets/the-ictd-government-revenue-dataset. Future updates of the data will be
hosted by UNU WIDER, and are available here: https://www.wider.unu.edu/pro-
ject/government-revenue-dataset. An earlier working paper version of this paper
reported results emplying the original 2014 version of the ICTD data, while the 2016
version of the data, used here, is significantly improved in terms of coverage, accuracy
and the length of the time series.33 resource dependent states that collect at least 10% of GDP in
non-tax revenue7 and for which any data is available. It then com-
pares data coverage here to data coverage in the two most high pro-
file papers to have previously run similar tests linking the
composition of government revenue to levels of democracy (Ross,
2004; Morrison, 2009).8 The table notes countries for which there
was either (a) no data in earlier studies, (b) extremely limited data,
or (c) data that was analytically problematic owing to a failure in
earlier international datasets to adequately distinguish between nor-
mal tax revenues and resource revenues.9
The limitations of those early papers are immediately apparent.
A seminal paper by Ross (2004) exploring the connections between
tax reliance and democracy contains no data for nine of the 33
countries, limited data for six countries, and contains data that is
analytically problematic – and often severely so – for an additional
fourteen countries. Data is relatively complete, and entirely free of
problems, for only four of 33 countries. More recent work by
Morrison (2009) rightly excludes the most analytically problematic
data, but at the expense of extremely limited data coverage: His
dataset contains no data for fifteen of these countries, very limited
data for an additional five, and analytically problematic data for
seven more countries. Relatively complete and accurate data is
available for only seven of 33 resource-dependent countries. While
these data problems merely reflect the limits of earlier datasets,
and efforts by the authors to ask important questions while
employing the best available data at the time, they raise serious
concerns about the reliability of earlier results.
With access to this new data we implement three distinct sets
of econometric tests: Generalized Method of Moments (GMM),
Mean-Group Estimators (MG), and Random and Fixed-Effects Logit
estimators. All of the estimators yield clear support for the exis-
tence of a political resource curse that is both statistically signifi-
cant and large in magnitude. In turn, we are able to explicitly
demonstrate that, consistent with theory, all of the results are
stronger when focusing on the composition of government revenue,
rather than resource income, while the results are similarly stronger
when employing estimators that focus on the long-term relation-
ship between revenue and democracy, rather than focusing exclu-
sively on short-term changes.
The paper proceeds in seven parts. The next section presents a
brief review of the relevant literature. The second section presents
the new data and the construction of the revenue variables. The
third section presents the empirical strategy, reviewing the ratio-
nale for a range of alternative econometric models. The fourth sec-
tion presents the core results and the fifth section presents
robustness checks. The sixth section offers a discussion of the core
results. The final section concludes.
2. Going back to basics: Model specification and data
Most studies of the political resource curse propose that natural
resource wealth – and other forms of non-tax revenue – are likely
to undermine the quality of a country’s governance by disconnect-
ing governments from their citizens, supporting the expansion of
corruption, patronage and repression, and increasing the risk of
conflict (Ross, 2015). Beginning with Ross (2001), a wide array of
cross-country econometric studies have reported support for such7 Of which the majority is from non-renewable natural resources.
8 Haber and Menaldo (2011) construct a similar fiscal reliance variable, but it
covers only 14 of the 33 countries listed here. Morrison (2015) provides a more recent
version of his 2009 results. It was unfortunately not possible to access that data, but
the sample sizes are almost identical to those from the 2009 paper.
9 This issue is discussed at length later in the paper. Data is labeled ‘‘analytically
problematic” if the share of tax revenue in total government revenue reported in the
original source is at least 50% larger than the level reported in the more accurate ICTD
GRD.
Table 1
Comparative data coverage for resource dependent states.
ICTD GRD Ross (2004) Morrison (2009)
Angola Included Omitted Omitted
United Arab Emirates Included Omitted Omitted
Azerbaijan Included Omitted Omitted
Bahrain Included Analytically problematic Analytically problematic
Bolivia Included Analytically problematic Included
Brunei Included Omitted Omitted
Bhutan Included Included Included
Botswana Included Analytically problematic Omitted
Republic of the Congo Included Analytically problematic Limited data
Algeria Included Limited data, analytically problematic Omitted
Ecuador Included Analytically problematic Omitted
Egypt Included Analytically problematic Analytically problematic
Gabon Included Analytically problematic Analytically problematic, no data after 1991
Equatorial Guinea Included Omitted Omitted
Iran Included Analytically problematic Analytically problematic
Iraq Included Omitted Omitted
Kazakhstan Included Omitted Included
Kuwait Included Included Included
Libya Included Omitted Omitted
Mongolia Included Included Included
Mauritania Included No data after 1980 Omitted
Malaysia Included Analytically problematic Analytically problematic
Nigeria Included No data after 1987 Omitted
Norway Included Included Included
Oman Included Analytically problematic Omitted
Russian Federation Included Limited data, Analytically problematic Limited data
Saudi Arabia Included Omitted Omitted
Sudan Included No data after 1982 Omitted
Syria Included Analytically problematic Analytically problematic
Chad Included No data after 1991 No data after 1991
Trinidad and Tobago Included Analytically problematic Limited data, analytically problematic
Venezuela Included Analytically problematic Analytically problematic
Yemen Included Analytically problematic Analytically problematic
Notes: Excludes recently independent Timor-Leste and South Sudan.
W. Prichard et al. /World Development 109 (2018) 295–312 297a negative relationship, focusing particularly on the impact of nat-
ural resource wealth on levels of democracy (Wantchekon, 2002;
Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Ross, 2004; Tsui, 2010; Aslaksen,
2010; Ramsay, 2011; Ross, 2012; Andersen & Ross, 2014; Wiens
et al., 2014; Ahmadov, 2014; Lall, 2017).
However, a smaller group of researchers have continued to
question the robustness of these results. The most high profile
challenge has come from Haber and Menaldo (2011), who con-
structed a new cross-country data set of national resource income
dating back to 1800, and reported no consistent support for the
existence of a political resource curse. Elsewhere, critics have
argued that the apparent relationship may be driven by endogene-
ity or mismeasurement, or may be offset by countervailing positive
effects of resource wealth (e.g. Brooks & Kurtz, 2016; Liou &
Musgrave, 2014; Bruckner, Ciccone & Tisei, 2012; Wacziarg,
2012; Dunning, 2008; Herb, 2005)10. Meanwhile, Morrison (2009,
2015) and Smith (2004) have argued that natural resource wealth
is not inherently anti-democratic but, instead, tends to increase
regime stability – while Morrison has argued that higher taxation
has the opposite, destabilizing effect.
While these conflicting findings are indicative of a rich intellec-
tual debate, their inconsistency is also a source of concern: Why,
despite a well-defined research question, do we not see greater
empirical agreement across studies? Recent debates have tended
to focus particularly on disagreements about appropriate econo-
metric methods, and appropriate country samples, but have failed
to yield agreement (see, for example, Haber & Menaldo, 2011;
Andersen & Ross, 2014; Wiens et al., 2014). By contrast, we focus
on a much simpler possibility: that conflicting results reflect basic,10 Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) and Alexeev and Conrad (2009) make a similar
argument, though with a focus on explaining alternative dependent variables.but foundational, problems of model specification and data. The
focus on data problems mirrors the intuition in Lall (2017), who
employs multiple imputation to fill gaps in major datasets. How-
ever we go further, by introducing new data rather than relying
on imputation, and adopting more appropriate empirical measures
of the concepts of interest.
The most prominent theories of the political resource curse do
not focus on the political implications of resource wealth in gen-
eral, but focus more specifically on the political implications of dif-
ferences in the composition of government revenue – driven, in
particular, by revenue from non-renewable natural resources. This
analytical focus on government revenue is rooted in part in early
accounts of autocracy in resource rich states (Mahdavy, 1970;
Beblawi & Luciani 1987). Its deeper roots lie in the broad tradition
of fiscal sociology, which proposed that the character of states
could be explained in significant part by differences in the sources
of government revenue – and, in particular, by differences between
states that could rely on captive sources of non-tax revenue, and
states that needed to rely on the taxation of their own citizens.11
This relationship is most commonly attributed to two related,
but distinct, mechanisms. On one hand, governments with access
to captive sources of non-tax revenue, primarily from natural
resources, will be empowered to resist political opposition through
repression or through expanded public spending and patronage.
On the other hand, governments that rely heavily on tax revenue
will need to bargain with mobile taxpayers, conceding greater
accountability and democracy in exchange for tax payments
(Tilly, 1992; Levi, 1988). Ulfelder (2007) and others refer to these11 The most famous scholar in this tradition was Joseph Schumpeter. For a summary
see Moore 2004.
14 A more detailed discussion is available in Prichard, Cobham and Goodall (2014).
15 We employ the preferred ‘‘merged” ICTD GRD dataset, which employs general
government data for fiscally decentralized states, and more widely available central
government data otherwise. A small number of potential observations are excluded
from the analysis owing to (a) an inability to deal effectively with resource revenues,
(b) highly irregular and questionable data, or (c) analytical incomparability. These
exclusions are recommended in the guide to the dataset, and are described in detail in
Prichard, Cobham and Goodall (2014).
16 The analysis here focuses on data beginning in 1990, as it offers the most
complete coverage. As demonstrated in the Appendix, the results are nonetheless
298 W. Prichard et al. /World Development 109 (2018) 295–312alternatives as the ‘‘supply-side” and ‘‘demand-side” of the politi-
cal resource curse, respectively.
However, most contemporary econometric tests of the political
resource curse have not focused on the impact of resource revenue
on democracy, but instead on the connections between the total
value of resource production (‘‘resource income”) – either as a share
of GDP or in absolute terms – and democracy. This is a critical the-
oretical distinction. A government that is able to capture extensive
revenue from the exploitation of natural resource wealth will be
able to spend that revenue on patronage and repression, while it
will have less need to bargain with taxpayers. Critically, the same
effects will not hold true to the same extent where a country has
high resource income, but where it captures only a smaller propor-
tion of resource rents as government revenue. This is, in turn, empir-
ically significant: resource income is an imperfect substitute for
measuring the composition of government revenue, both because
the translation of resource wealth into resource revenue varies
across resources and countries12 and because focusing on resource
income entirely ignores the level of non-resource tax collection –
that is, the ‘‘demand side” of dominant theories of the resource
curse.
Tellingly, there is broad agreement on the theoretical appropri-
ateness of employing measures of the composition of government
revenue – even among some researchers who have relied primarily
on measures of resource income. Haber and Menaldo (2011) con-
struct a measure of ‘‘fiscal reliance”, defined as the share of natural
resource revenue in total government revenue, but it covers only
19 countries owing to difficulties of gathering relevant data.
Wiens, et al. (2014: 786) note explicitly that government revenue
is ‘‘our theoretical quantity of interest”, but that they rely on mea-
sures of resource income for reasons of practicality. Why do we
observe this disconnect between theory and practice? Most simply,
the low quality of previously available data on government rev-
enues has led most existing researchers to rely on measures of
resource income, which have been more readily available and com-
plete. Meanwhile, as discussed in the introduction, the robustnesss
of the results from a handful of studies that have employed govern-
ment revenue data are open to question owing to data problems
(Ross, 2004; Morrison, 2009, 2015).
Against this background, the central contribution of this study
lies in introducing the ICTD GRD, which contains more complete
and accurate data on the composition of government revenue. This
allows us to directly test the impact of changes in the composition
of government revenue on levels of democracy, thus more pre-
cisely capturing the core theoretical propositions underpinning
the political resource, and increasing the accuracy of our resultant
estimates.13
3. Data and variables
The ICTD GRD has several key advantages relative to earlier
government revenue datasets, of which two are most critical:12 The most important variation is between oil and mineral resources, with the
former generally translated into significantly greater government revenue. Variation
may equally come from the ease with which resources can be extracted, the nature of
the contracts governing resource extraction, or simple administrative effectiveness in
collecting revenues due.
13 Some have argued that this approach may suffer from problems of endogeneity:
low-income countries may be highly dependent on resource revenue not because the
resource sector is large, but because the rest of the economy is small and tax
collection is weak (Dunning, 2008; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008). These authors
have favored employing absolute measures of resource wealth per capita. However,
this seems unwarranted here: Doing so distorts the research question (which is
fundamentally about the relative share of resource wealth), prevents measuring the
revenue driven causal process precisely, and is only relevant if income is a significant
predictor of democracy, which recent studies call into question – see, for example,
Acemoglu et al. (2008).Improved coverage, and a more consistent distinction between
tax and non-tax sources of revenue.14 Previous research has relied
primarily on data from the IMF and World Bank, both of which have
historically been plagued by missing data (Ross, 2004; Morrison,
2009, 2015), or on datasets that offer relatively more complete data
coverage for only a very limited subset of countries or years (Haber &
Menaldo, 2011; Baskaran & Bigsten, 2013). By contrast, the ICTD
GRD covers 188 countries and a total of 3763 country-year observa-
tions during the period 1990–2012.15 This was, at the time of the
analysis, almost 70% more developing country observations than
the IMF Government Finance Statistics during the same period.16
At least as important are substantial improvements in the ana-
lytical accuracy of the data, particularly through the creation of a
consistent distinction between tax and non-tax revenue.17 These
improvements are, in turn, pivotal to improvements in data coverage
for resource rich states. Such states are critical to any test of theories
linking government revenue and democracy. However, because ear-
lier data did not consistently allow for distinguishing between
resource and non-resource sources of revenue, resource rich states
have been systematically under-represented in the data underpin-
ning existing studies, as illustrated earlier in Table 1.
At its simplest, the resource curse hypothesis distinguishes the
political effects of two types of revenue: revenue from natural
resources, and all other types of government revenue. Moore
(1998) provides a slightly more general formulation, distinguishing
between ‘‘unearned” revenue, which is collected from narrow and
relatively captive sources (primarily, but not exclusively, non-
renewable natural resource revenues), and ‘‘earned” revenue,
which is collected from a broader base of individual taxpayers
and businesses.18 This has, in turn, been operationalized in existing
studies as a distinction between ‘‘tax revenue” (‘‘earned”) and ‘‘non-
tax revenue” (‘‘unearned”) (Morrison, 2009, 2015; Ross, 2004).
Unfortunately, this operationalization in earlier studies has
been empirically problematic. In general, governments collect
resource revenues in two ways: (i) corporate taxes on resource
firms and (ii) various types of royalties and levies.19 From a political
economy perspective, both types of revenue should be classified as
‘‘non-tax revenue”, as they are captive types of revenue expected
to reinforce government power. However, following an accounting
logic, international databases have generally recorded the former
as ‘‘taxes”, and the latter as ‘‘non-tax revenue”20 – thus obfuscating
the distinction between ‘‘earned” and ‘‘unearned” revenue relevant
for testing the existence of the resource curse.robust to employing earlier data. It is important to note that the IMF GFS is constantly
evolving – and, recently at least, improving – and these figures are thus accurate as of
the time of the creation of the version of the ICTD GRD on which we rely.
17 Additional improvements result from employing a consistent GDP series,
removing clearly implausible or analytically problematic data, and standardizing
the treatment of social contributions. See Prichard, Cobham and Goodall 2014.
18 The primary component of ‘‘unearned” revenue is resource revenues, but this
category also includes other types of captive revenue - state owned enterprises,
property income, investment funds and the like, thus providing a more complete
picture of the composition of government finances.
19 For simplicity these terms are used broadly to include royalties as such, profit
sharing, the auction values of exploration and extraction rights and any other legal
mechanism – other than taxes – for transferring natural resource rents to the
government.
20 This describes the general pattern, but each country is somewhat unique, and the
ICTD GRD has correspondingly ‘corrected’ the data country-by-country.
Tax Revenue Non-Tax Revenue 
IMF GFS Non-Resource Direct Tax  
Non-Resource Indirect Tax 
Corporate Taxes on Private Resource 
Companies
Resource Non-Tax Revenue  
Non-Resource Non-Tax Revenue
ICTD GRD Non-Resource Direct Tax  
Non-Resource Indirect Tax 
Resource Non-Tax Revenue  
Corporate Taxes on Private Resource 
Companies
Non-Resource Non-Tax Revenue 
Fig. 1. Re-categorization of resource revenues in ICTD GRD.
Table 2
Corrected data in the ICTD GRD: Illustrations in levels.
Source Total revenue Total tax Total non-tax revenue Tax reliance as share of government revenue
Angola 2002 ICTD GRD 35.1% 7.8% 27.3% 0.222
IMF GFS 35.6% 28.4% 7.2% 0.798
Kazakhstan 2010 ICTD GRD 23.9% 12.7% 8.0% 0.531
IMF GFS 22% 19.3% 2.7% 0.877
Source: Authors’ calculations. IMF GFS data downloaded in July 2015.
Fig. 2. Corrected data in the ICTD GRD: Time Series Illustration.
W. Prichard et al. /World Development 109 (2018) 295–312 299The key innovation of the ICTD GRD has correspondingly been
to allow us to re-classify corporate taxation of resource firms as
‘‘non-tax revenue”, in order to align our empirical measures with
theory.21 This shift is illustrated in Fig. 1, while Table 2 and Fig. 2
provide examples of the impact of this shift on the data reported
for individual countries by comparing the ICTD data to data from
the IMF GFS22, illustrating both effects in levels and the benefits of
the ICTD GRD in reducing misleading volatility in the data over
time.23 These benefits of re-classification are in addition to the large
increase in data coverage, noted above, that are allowed for by this
classification method. Of course, the resultant data still suffers from
standard concerns about measurement error or misreporting when21 This process draws primarily on IMF Article IV Reports. Occasional country-year
observations for which this distinction cannot be successfully drawn are excluded
from the analysis.
22 Data as of 2015, when the version of ICTD GRD that we employ was downloaded.
23 The Angolan case is relatively extreme in its magnitude, but for this reason serves
as a particularly clear illustration. The case of Kazakhstan is of a magnitude more
comparable to other cases.using self-reported government data. It is, in particular, possible that
there may, in some cases, be underestimation of non-tax revenues
where they flow off-budget, as may be the case in some large and
relatively un-transparent resource producing states. However, sys-
tematic comparison across time and data sources gives us significant
confidence that these concerns are, at worst, relatively modest and
that the data tells a much more accurate story than earlier options.
Having made this adjustment to the data, we are able to con-
struct measures of our concepts of interest that are more analyti-
cally accurate than previous studies. The first variable captures
total tax collection as a share of GDP (tottax) exclusive of resource
revenues, thus making it a more consistent proxy for ‘‘earned”
income. The second variable captures total non-tax revenue, inclu-
sive of all resource revenues but excluding grants,24 as a share of24 We exclude aid grants from non-tax revenue owing to problems of data
availability and accuracy, and reflecting significant evidence elsewhere that aid
may affect government incentives differently than natural resource rents. See, for
example, Morrissey, Prichard and Torrance (2014).
Fig. 3. Relationship between tax reliance and polity using country averages, 1990–
2012.
Fig. 4. Relationship between total tax revenue and polity using country averages,
1990–2012.
300 W. Prichard et al. /World Development 109 (2018) 295–312GDP (totnontax), and is a proxy for ‘‘unearned” income.25 Finally, we
are able to combine these two variables to construct a measure of tax
reliance (tax_rel), which measures the share of non-resource tax rev-
enue in total government revenue.26 All of our econometric tests first
look at the impact of tax reliance (tax_rel) on democracy, following
Ross (2004), after which we disaggregate tax reliance into its compo-
nent parts, tottax and totnontax, in an effort to disentangle their
respective roles, following Morrison (2009, 2015).
Our primary dependent variable is Democracy, which is con-
structed by employing the Polity2 measure of democracy, and nor-
malizing it to the range 0–100 (Marshall & Jaggers, 2008).27 In our
logit regressions, we employ a binary measure of democracy, Regime,
with democracies coded 1, drawn from Cheibub, Ghandi and
Vreeland (2010). Owing to significant questions about the robust-
ness of different predictors of democracy, we include a relatively
limited set of widely used control variables in our core results. The
most widely cited predictor of accountability remains log GDP per
capita (lgdp), which we draw from the World Economic Outlook
database.28 We equally include a measure of economic growth, from
the World Development Indicators, to capture more proximate eco-
nomic performance (Growthpc). Finally, we include a dummy vari-
able for the occurrence of violent conflict (Civil_War), which we
draw from Haber and Menaldo (2011) and extend to 2012 using
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. In the Appendix we show
robustness to different constellations of these variables, as well as
to two less widely used variables employed by Haber and Menaldo
(2011): population (Pop), and regional democratic diffusion
(Regional_Dem_Diffuse).
Figs. 3, 4 and 5 present simple correlations between average
values over the period 1990–2012 of our core dependent variable,
Democracy, and our three alternative revenue measures: Tax_rel
(tax reliance), Tottax (total tax revenue) and Totnontax (total non-
tax revenue).
As expected, countries that are more reliant on tax revenue, and
less reliant on non-tax revenue, tend to be more democratic. Par-
ticularly striking are patterns among resource producers. There
are 18 countries29 that have collected an average of at least 13% of
GDP in non-tax revenue, and only two – Botswana and Timor Leste
– have been even weak democracies, as judged by having an average
score of at least 50 (out of 100) on our adjusted polity variable30. Still
more striking, of 29 countries31 for which less than 60% of total gov-
ernment revenue comes from non-resource taxes only 3 have, on
average, met even the very limited definition of democracy above
(Venezuela, Botswana and Timor Leste).Fig. 5. Relationship between total non-tax revenue and polity using country
averages, 1990–2012.
25 An argument could be made for focusing exclusively on natural resource revenue,
as opposed to broader non-tax revenue. There are two reasons why we do not. First,
pragmatic: consistent data on resource revenues specifically is not sufficiently widely
available, while the vast majority of variation in non-tax revenue is, in any event,
explained by resource revenues. Second, conceptual: Among the other primary
drivers of variation in non-tax revenue are other ‘‘unearned” revenue sources,
including revenue from state investment funds, state monopolies and enterprises, and
fishing or forestry licenses.
26 Mathematically, tax_rel = tottax / (tottax+totnontax)
27 The raw polity2 measure runs from -10 to 10. Normalization involves treating
each 1 point increment in the raw data as a half point increment from 0 to 10, and
then multiplying by 10.
28 For consistency, as this is the same figure employed in the ICTD dataset.
29 Angola, UAE, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Republic of the Congo, Algeria,
Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Timor-Leste, Yemen.
30 Equivalent to a 0 for the unadjusted polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset.
31 Angola, UAE, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Botswana, Republic of the Congo,
Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Turkmenistan, Timor-Leste, Venezuela, Yemen.
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Seeking to move beyond simple correlations, we estimate sev-
eral alternative econometric models that draw on the existing lit-
erature: A System-GMM panel estimator, a Mean Groups
estimator to more fully exploit the time series dimension of our
macro panel and, finally, random and fixed effects logit models
designed to focus attention on the likelihood of transitions to (or
from) democracy. Each estimator is subject to particular, but dis-
tinct, limitations. We view their parallel implementation as the
best means to account for potential weaknesses in any individual
estimation strategy, while also shedding light on underlying fea-
tures of the relationship between revenues and democracy.32
4.1. Pooled OLS, fixed effects and general method of moments
We begin with the following simple dynamic specification:
Democracyi;t ¼ dDemocracyi;tl þ b1Taxreli;tl þ X0i;tlcþ ai þ kt þ ei;t
ð1Þ
In the basic specification Democracyi,t is for country i in period t.
On the right-hand side of Eq. (1) we include a lagged value of the
dependent variable both to model the persistence of democracy
over time and to account for potential mean reverting dynamics.
The key independent variable of interest is the lagged value of
Tax_reli. In our main specifications we consider a single year lag,
t-l where l = 1, while we later run robustness checks using l = 3
and l = 5. The estimated parameter b1 captures the relationship
between tax reliance and the extent of democracy. The vector X0i,t
includes our time-varying control variables. We add country fixed
effects, ai, to control for omitted country-specific factors, and time
dummies, kt, to control for time-varying shocks that are common
across countries. In all regressions, the error term, ei,t, captures
all other omitted factors.
After initially estimating the model using tax_rel as our inde-
pendent variable, we disaggregate tax reliance into its component
parts – tax revenue as a share of GDP (tottax) and non-tax revenue
as a share of GDP (totnotax) – in order to attempt to disentangle
competing arguments about the links between revenue and expen-
ditures. Thus the second specification is:
Democracyi;t ¼ dDemocracyi;tl þ b1tottaxi;tl
þ b2totnontaxi;tl þ X0i;tlcþ ai þ kt þ ei;t ð2Þ
An important concern in relation to the tax reliance (tax_rel)
and total tax revenue (tottax) variables is the possibility of reverse
causation: while increased taxation may drive increased democ-
racy, increased democracy might also lead to increased taxation
(Levi, 1988; Timmons, 2010). This concern does not appear to
apply to non-tax revenue, as there is no clear reason to expect
democracy to shape non-tax revenue collection. Ross (2004: 238)
argues that the use of a lagged dependent variable is the best avail-
able means to address the problem of reverse causality, based on32 In theory a more econometrically ideal approach would be to identify a source of
exogenous variation in tax and non-tax revenue by adopting a quasi-experimental
design, or by employing instrumental variables. However, over more than a decade of
econometric research neither strategy has been implemented fully convincingly, with
only highly imperfect instruments available for capturing variation in the shares of
tax and non-tax revenue. Studies employing instrumental variables, or exogenous
variation, have generally relied on variation in oil prices, but this is a more useful
instrument for resource income than resource revenues, generally implies a focus on
total resource income, rather than focusing on the more analytically appropriate share
of resource revenue in total government revenue, and implies a potentially overly
narrow understanding of the mechanisms of the underlying relationship of interest.
We therefore follow the existing literature on government revenues in concluding
that panel data methods offer the best available strategy despite sacrificing an ability
to strictly rule out all concerns about endogeneity.the assumption that, ‘‘a change in the independent variables (taxes
and government services) should precede a change in the depen-
dent variable (regime type).” We thus initially follow this advice
from Ross, before also implementing dynamic panel data methods
explicitly designed to deal with potentially endogenous regressors.
It is important to note that, as described in Bellemare, Masaki and
Pepinsky (2017: 958), the GMM methods we use are not immune
to endogeneity bias. However, Bellemare, et al. (2017) do find that
they perform better than alternatives, thus making them a
nonetheless instructive set of tests when paired with the other
models that we estimate.
For the sake of completeness, we begin by following Ross (2004)
in implementing a simple Pooled OLS model with lagged depen-
dent variables. However, the Pooled OLS model omits country
fixed-effects, and may suffer from omitted variables bias. We sub-
sequently run a fixed effects (FE) model in order to control for
time-invariant country heterogeneity. However, FE estimates that
include a lagged dependent variable as a regressor, as in our case,
are biased because of the correlation between the lagged depen-
dent variable and the error term (Nickell, 1981). Meanwhile, by
focusing exclusively on short-term within country variation and
excluding cross-country variation, the FE model is particularly
restrictive in modeling the relationship of interest.
In order to estimate a dynamic process with fixed effects we
thus prefer to follow Aslaksen (2010) and others in employing
GMM estimators that use instruments generated from the time
series. The GMM models are considered the best estimator for
dynamic processes with fixed effects where there are potentially
endogenous regressors, and idiosyncratic disturbances.
Difference-GMM uses first differences as instruments, while
system-GMM uses both first differences and lagged levels. Sys-
GMM is preferable when – as in this case – there is a high degree
of persistence of the variables of interest (Blundell & Bond, 1998).
By using lagged levels of the variables as instruments Sys-GMM
preserves information on cross-country differences that is lost
when only the first differenced equation is estimated, and is there-
fore more efficient (Aslaksen, 2010).
4.2. Mean group-common correlated effects (CCE-MG) estimator
While Sys-GMM is widely used, it is not without limitations.
Alongside not strictly removing concerns about endogeneity, its
comparative advantage is with large-N but small-T datasets,
whereas we have up to 23 years of data from 1990 to 2012. In our
view the most appropriate method for exploiting the time series
dimension of the data is to use the mean group-common correlated
effects (CCE-MG) estimator, which has been developed specifically
to deal with such ‘‘macro panels”.33 Relative to conventional panel
techniques it addresses both parameter heterogeneity and cross-
section dependence (Pesaran, 2006; Pesaran & Smith, 1995).
However, this comes at a cost: the MG estimator does not
model dynamics, and does not account for reverse causality. As
such, if there is reverse causality then MG estimates will include
the effects of both directions of causality. Indeed, we find that
our democracy variable does Granger-cause our revenue variables,
suggesting that there is reverse causality. Our estimates for the tax
variables are thus best understood as upper bounds.34 GMM-based
estimates, while suffering from problematic instruments in the33 Haber and Menaldo (2011) argue for employing Error Correction Mechanism
Regressions. This choice has been challenged on conceptual grounds by Andersen and
Ross (2014). More importantly, ECM regressions are more appropriate to their much
longer panel, and prove very sensitive when employed with our shorter panel. We
thus conclude that they should be excluded. That said, the results are not inconsistent
with those reported here. Further information available on request.
34 That said, more detailed research on the impact of democracy on tax collection
has generally suggested either no or very small effects (Cheibub, 1998).
35 This includes 16 transitions to autocracy, and 46 transitions to democracy. When
the data is extended to 1980–2012 in our robustness checks it includes 24 transitions
to autocracy and 63 transitions to democracy, across 41 countries.
36 While not reported here owing to constraints of space we also test a simple linear
probability model without fixed effects, in order to include countries with no
variation in the dependent variable: a constant dependent variable can be as
informative as a varying one. The results are similar to those for the random effects
model, reported below, and thus reinforce the overall story. Detailed results available
on request from the authors.
37 When a trend is included the results are significant and comparable, but the trend
itself is insignificant – and we thus do not report it here.
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lem, thus making the two methods complementary in triangulating
the relationship of interest.
4.3. Logistic regressions focusing on regime transitions
The GMM and CCE-MG estimators offer complementary
approaches to estimating the relationship between government
revenue and continuous measures of democracy. However, several
recent studies have argued for a more narrow focus on the likeli-
hood of transitions from autocracy to democracy or, alternatively,
from democracy to autocracy.
At the level of theory, Smith (2004), Morrison (2009, 2015) and
others have proposed that non-tax revenue may not be inherently
pro or anti-democratic, but may simply make any existing form of
government more resistant to change. In this case, we would not
expect a consistently positive, or negative, relationship between
non-tax revenue and democracy, but, instead, an impact of non-
tax revenue on the likelihood of political transitions. A focus on
regime transitions equally addresses a pragmatic estimation prob-
lem: Many resource rich countries were already undemocratic
prior to acquiring large-scale resource revenues. In these cases
non-tax revenue cannot lead to reduced democracy, but is instead
expected to make autocracy more durable and thus reduce the
likelihood of democratic transitions (Andersen & Ross, 2014).
We followWiens et al. (2014) (henceforth WPC) in estimating a
dynamic logit model that captures the impact of the composition
of government revenue on the likelihood that a country will tran-
sition between democracy and autocracy. Following WPC our pre-
diction is that higher non-tax revenue, and reduced tax reliance,
will reduce the likelihood of transitions to democracy. In turn we
expect greater tax collection to be associated with an increased
likelihood of transitions to democracy, and greater stability in
existing democracies.
In order to test these predictions the model differs somewhat
from the discussion so far. When we test the impact of tax_rel it is:
PrðRegimei;tÞ¼K dRegimei;t1þb1Taxrel i;t1þb2Regime
h
Taxrel i;t1þb3Xi;t1þb4Regimei;t1Xi;t1þktþ ei;t
i
ð3Þ
While separating tax_rel into its component parts, tottax and
totnontax, gives us:
PrðRegimei;tÞ ¼ K dRegimei;t1 þ b1TotTaxi;t1 þ b2Regime
h
TotTaxi;t1 þ b3TotNonTaxi;t1 þ b4Regime
TotNonTaxrel i;t1 þ b5Xi;t1 þ b6Regimei;t1
Xi;t1þkt þ ei;t
i
ð4Þ
In both equations the new measure of democracy is the binary
variable Regime, described earlier.
The key innovation in WPC, and replicated here, is the inclusion
of interaction terms between lagged Regime and each of the vari-
ables on the right-hand side of the equation. The interaction terms
condition the effect of each of the independent variables on the
presence, or absence, of democracy. This allows us to identify
whether the relationship between the revenue variables and
democracy differs between existing democracies and autocracies.
The total coefficient on the revenue variables in democracies is
thus the sum of the coefficients on the revenue terms, and on the
interaction terms between the revenue terms and Regime.
As with earlier models, we wish to account for the effects of
unobserved country heterogeneity. However, the inclusion of
fixed-effects results in dropping from the analysis any country thatdid not experience a political transition between 1990 and 2010.
This leaves only 29 countries, while excluding almost all major
resource producers.35 WPC address this problem by employing a
random-effects specification in order to account for unobserved
country heterogeneity as far as possible while retaining necessary
country coverage. A Hausman test of the validity of adopting the
random-effects specification returns a negative value, which is gen-
erally interpreted as a valid basis for employing random effects, but
still somewhat inconclusive. We thus report results employing both
the random-effects and fixed-effects estimations, as we find the key
messages are broadly consistent.365. Results
We first present results employing our array of panel data tech-
niques, before turning to the results of the dynamic logit regres-
sions. Table 3a presents estimates for Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects,
Diff- and Sys-GMM and CCE-MGmodels, with tax reliance (tax_rel)
as the independent variable. Table 3b presents estimates when we
instead include total tax revenue (tottax) and total non-tax revenue
(totnontax) as distinct regressors. The Sys-GMM estimates employ
two-step Windmeijer corrected standard errors, and include tests
for second-order autocorrelation, as well as the Hansen test of
instrument validity, and in all cases we fail to reject the null
hypothesis that the results are valid. The CCE-MG tests include
the Maddala and Wu panel unit root test, which in all cases rejects
non-stationarity at the 1% level.
As can be seen in Table 3a, pooled OLS produces a strongly sig-
nificant positive coefficient on (lagged) tax reliance, but the coeffi-
cient is insignificant when we take country-specific fixed effects
into account with the FE model. Turning to the GMM estimates,
the results remain insignificant when employing the Diff-GMM
estimator, but are again positive and significant at the 5% level
when we use Sys-GMM. As discussed above, following Aslaksen
(2010), we view the Sys-GMM results to be most valid, and attri-
bute the stronger results to the fact that the Sys-GMM estimator
makes use of a wider variety of information and is thus more effi-
cient when the key variables change slowly. Finally, the CCE-MG
estimates a similarly positive coefficients on tax reliance, signifi-
cant at the 5% level.37
Table 3b disaggregates tax reliance into tax revenue (tottax) and
non-tax revenue (totnontax). The results again offer support for the
political resource curse, and suggest that the positive and signifi-
cant coefficients on tax reliance are driven primarily by the anti-
democratic effect of non-tax revenue. The coefficient on totnontax
has the expected negative sign in all of the tests, and is statistically
significant in the Pooled OLS, Sys-GMM and CCE-MG specifications.
The results for tottax are more complex. We find the expected pos-
itive sign in all but the fixed-effects estimates, but significant only
using CCE-MG. By contrast, we find an unexpectedly negative and
significant sign for the FE model. This suggests a contrast between
models that include information on the long-term relationship in
levels, as opposed to a focus exclusively on shorter-term changes.
We return to this issue in the discussion to follow.
Table 3a
Effect of tax reliance on polity, across different estimation methods, preferred covariates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS FE Diff-GMM two-step Sys-GMM two-step CCE-MG w/o trend
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
L.Polity_s 0.9491*** 0.7457*** 0.8103*** 0.8299***
(0.0097) (0.0266) (0.0377) (0.0355)
L.Tax_Rel 3.5122*** 0.5047 1.8954 10.7145**
(1.0339) (2.5164) (6.9337) (4.9556)
Tax_Rel 24.5997**
(9.9183)
L.lgdp 0.1770 0.0178 0.3564 0.7634
(0.1332) (0.8858) (1.5514) (1.1882)
lgdp 11.2563
(8.0119)
L.CivilWar 0.3073 1.4645 2.3198 2.0121
(0.4807) (1.1733) (1.5542) (1.4600)
CivilWar 0.7931*
(0.4553)
L.Growthpc 0.0310 0.0097 0.0036 0.0104
(0.0222) (0.0263) (0.0330) (0.0341)
Growthpc 0.1329
(0.1244)
trend
Implied Long-Term Effect 9.99 62.99
AR(1) 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.210 0.225
Hansen 0.092 0.127
No. of Obs. 2954 2954 2799 2954 3022
No. of Countries 155 155 155 151
r2 0.945 0.645
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Implied long-term effect of Tax_Rel calculated as b/(1 x), where x is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, and b is the
coefficient on the revenue variable.
Table 3b
Effect of total tax and non-tax revenue on polity, across different estimation methods, preferred covariates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS FE Diff-GMM two-step Sys-GMM two-step CCE-MG w/o trend
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
L.Polity_s 0.9515*** 0.7464*** 0.7987*** 0.8402***
(0.0095) (0.0265) (0.0358) (0.0329)
L.TotTax 3.2268 10.0648* 7.8252 0.1068
(2.3268) (5.6807) (15.7795) (10.6174)
L.totnontax 5.9031*** 3.7349 4.5045 16.4406**
(2.2055) (4.6339) (8.4422) (6.9217)
TotTax 57.3891**
(22.7934)
totnotax 100.8494**
(47.1368)
L.lgdp 0.0550 0.1496 0.7430 0.7822
(0.1395) (0.8856) (1.5271) (0.9539)
lgdp 5.4275
(6.7363)
L.CivilWar 0.3316 1.4849 2.042 2.0402
(0.4809) (1.1784) (1.5196) (1.5044)
CivilWar 1.1406**
(0.5479)
L.Growthpc 0.0316 0.0126 0.0042 0.0209
(0.0221) (0.0266) (0.0329) (0.0337)
Growthpc 0.1798*
(0.0980)
trend
Implied Long-Term Effect 22.38 102.88
AR(1) 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.214 0.230
Hansen 0.210 0.250
No. of Obs. 2954 2954 2799 2954 3017
No. of Countries 155 155 155 150
r2 0.945 0.645
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Implied long-term effect of Tax_Rel calculated as b/(1 x), where x is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, and b is the
coefficient on the revenue variable.
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ing first at the Sys-GMM estimates, the coefficient of 10.45 on tax_-
rel implies that a 10 percentage point increase in tax_rel is
associated with a short-term increase in Democracy of 1.05 per-
centage points. To place these magnitudes in perspective, a move
from the level of tax reliance of Nigeria (average tax_rel = 0.2) to
that of Senegal (average tax_rel = 0.9) is associated with a roughly
7 percentage point short-term increase in the level of democracy.
We can, in turn, calculate the implied long-term relationship,
reported near the bottom of Table 3a, and it is substantially larger:
Over the long-term the same increase in tax reliance is associated
with an increase in the level of democracy by 45 percentage points
– roughly the equivalent of going from Burkina Faso or Algeria to
Canada.
Encouragingly, the relationship between non-tax revenue and
democracy is of a similar magnitude (Table 3b): A change from
the level of non-tax revenue in Nigeria (average non-tax revenue
= 22% of GDP) to that of Senegal (average non-tax revenue = 1.5%
of GDP) is associated with a short-term increase in democracy of
3 percentage points, and a long-term rise of about 20 percentage
points. An increase in non-tax revenue to a level of 43% of GDP –
the level in Angola in 2008 – is associated with a long-term decline
in democracy of greater than 40 percentage points.Table 4a
Effect of tax reliance, total tax and non-tax revenue on regime using dynamic logit model
(1) (2) (3) (4
Logit – RE Logit – RE Logit – RE L
b/se b/se b/se b
L.regime 9.1918*** 4.5189*** 2.2683 2
(1.5327) (0.8771) (3.6946) (3
L.Tax_Rel 2.0800** 1.1210
(0.9073) (1.0663)
L.regimextaxrel 0.4291 2.2872
(1.9296) (1.9465)
L.TotTax 5.8995* 
(3.2053) (3
L.TotNonTax 10.7868*** 
(3.9705) (5
L.regimextottax 26.8080*** 2
(6.6025) (8
L.regimextotnontax 14.3523* 8
(7.5359) (7
L.lgdp 0.3088 0
(0.2227) (0
L.Civil_War 0.1221 
(0.4570) (0
L.Growthpc 0.0228 
(0.0304) (0
L.regimexlgdp 1.2500*** 0
(0.3882) (0
L.regimexcivilwar 1.7908** 
(0.7641) (0
L.regimexgrowthpc 0.1080 0
(0.0717) (0
Aggregate Effects in Democracies
b1 + b2 1.5600 2.7772*
(1.7208) (1.6430)
b1 + b3 20.9086*** 1
(5.77646) (7
b2 + b4 3.5654 
(6.4536) (5
Random Effects Model Descriptors
rl 0.0001925 0.000551 0.00161 0
q 1.13e08 9.22e08 7.89e07 8
N 2771 2771 2660 2
N_g 181 181 181 1
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. ‘‘b1 + b2” captures the joint significance of tax_rel a
‘‘b1 + b3” captures the joint significance of tottax and regime x tottax, while b2 + b4” capWhen we turn to the CCE-MG results we see a similar story. The
magnitude of the coefficient on tax_rel is somewhat smaller, with
the shift from Nigeria to Senegal associated with a still substantial
15 percentage point increase in democracy. Meanwhile the coeffi-
cient on totnontax implies that the same shift from Nigeria to Sene-
gal is associated with an almost 20 percentage point increase in
democracy – almost identical to the Sys-GMM estimate.
Table 4a presents results employing the dynamic random and
fixed effects logit models. The results estimate the effect of the
composition of government revenue on the likelihood of transi-
tions between autocracy and democracy. Columns 1 and 2 report
results for random-effects without controls, Columns 3 and 4
random-effects with controls, and Columns 5–8 the same results
employing fixed-effects.
The overall results are again generally consistent with expecta-
tions. In both the RE and FE models, the coefficient on tax_rel is
always positive, the coefficient on totnontax is always negative,
and at least one of the two is statistically significant at conventional
levels for every specification. We show below that these results
become still strongerwhenwe extend the time series, and thus cap-
ture a larger number of transitions. The distinct role of taxation is
again more ambiguous, as the sign is reversed between the FE
and RE results. However, we will show below that the results ares.
) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ogit – RE Logit – FE Logit – FE Logit – FE Logit – FE
/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
.4262 4.4391*** 4.4461*** 6.4427 7.4486**
.0741) (1.5608) (1.0677) (4.9639) (3.6915)
6.3509** 7.5869**
(2.8981) (3.2035)
1.7350
(1.9495)
6.9451* 13.1635 19.1017
.6907) (14.0760) (15.6223)
11.695** 12.6319 15.6038
.3393) (8.8320) (10.1852)
0.6205** 0.1911 2.2981
.1548) (8.3616) (9.6348)
.5020 0.4632 0.5772
.6031) (7.4342) (9.5025)
.0859 0.2762 0.0227
.2601) (1.9784) (1.9905)
0.2754 0.7225 0.8092
.4577) (0.6222) (0.6147)
0.0250 0.0033 0.0180
.0302) (0.0393) (0.0406)
.4164 0.2174 0.3162
.4443) (0.5088) (0.5271)
1.5057** 1.1524 1.1559
.7629) (0.8562) (0.8553)
.1146 0.1440 0.1557*
.0722) (0.0890) (0.0887)
6.3349** 7.6326**
(3.1731) (3.7359)
3.6753* 12.9724 16.8036
.2233) (15.1837) (16.6575)
3.1929 13.0952 16.1811
.4354) (9.7140) (11.0166)
.001647
.24e07
660 480 480 468 468
81 29 29 29 29
nd regime x taxrel, and thus captures the impact of tax_rel on regime in democracies.
tures the joint significance of totnontax and regime x totnontax.
Table 4b
Likelihood of transitions from autocracy to democracy.
Level of non-tax revenue as % of GDP
2% 5% 10% 20% 30%
Pr(Democracy) at t 0.0345 0.0241 0.0132 0.0039 0.0011
95% confidence interval (Upper) 0.0515 0.0348 0.0226 0.0102 0.0041
95% confidence interval (Lower) 0.0175 0.0134 0.0037 0.0025 0.0018
Level of Tax Reliance (Tax Revenue share of Total Gov’t Revenue)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.75 0.9
Pr(Democracy) at t 0.0118 0.0153 0.0198 0.0240 0.0290
95% confidence interval (Upper) 0.0256 0.0277 0.0301 0.0343 0.0441
95% confidence interval (Lower) 0.0018 0.0030 0.0095 0.0137 0.0140
Notes: Calculated based on Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4a, usingmargins command in stata, with regime = 0, civil_war = 0 and other variables set to their mean values excluding
OECD countries.
38 OilIncome is from Haber and Menaldo (2011), while OilIncShare and ResIncShare
are constructed using the matching GDP series in WPC (2014).
39 The large (though highly insignificant) coefficients on TotOilIncome, OilIncShare
and ResIncShare in the CCE-MG regressions reflect the fact that the majority of
countries have extremely low values for these variables relative to the dependent
variable. Since CCE-MG averages country-specific coefficients, the large coefficient is
not surprising given the overall insignificance of the results. If we limit the sample to
countries with oil income share greater than 1% of GDP then the coefficient returns to
a magnitude comparable to all other results (-20.5), but remains highly insignificant
(p=0.875).
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between changes in revenue and their political impacts.
Adding additional nuance are the interaction terms. While the
results described so far capture the relationship between changes
in the composition of government revenue and the likelihood of
transitions from autocracy to democracy, the interaction terms
capture the distinct relationship between the same variables in
existing democracies. We again find a positive impact of tax_rel
on democracy (row b1 + b2), indicating that greater tax reliance
has a stabilizing effect in existing democracies. However, the driver
of this relationship may be different in democracies than in autoc-
racies. Whereas non-tax revenue is strongly associated with lower
levels of democracy in autocracies, in democracies the coefficient
on totnontax is negative and significant in the fixed-effects esti-
mates, but highly insignificant in the random-effects estimates
(though it continues to have a negative sign) (row b2 + b4). By con-
trast, tax revenue, which is insignificant in autocracies, is positive
in all cases in democracies, and significant in both of the RE models
(row b1 + b3).
Because the logit estimates are non-linear, we separately calcu-
late the magnitude of the implied effects, reported in Tables 4b and
4c, drawing on the preferred results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4a.
Table 4b reports the likelihood that a country that is an autocracy
in period t-1 will become a democracy at time t, at different levels
of non-tax revenue and tax reliance. Again the magnitude of the
effects is substantial. With all other variables at their means for
developing countries, an autocratic country with non-tax revenue
of 2% of GDP has a 3.5% probability of transitioning to democracy
in a given year. By contrast, an autocratic country with non-tax
revenue of 10% of GDP (e.g. Malaysia) has only a 1.3% probability
of a democratic transition, while non-tax revenue of 20% of GDP
(e.g. Gabon or Chad) reduces that probability to 0.4%. Put differ-
ently, the likelihood of a democratic transition declines by almost
a third as non-tax revenue increases to 10% of GDP, and by more
than 80% when non-tax revenue increases to 20% of GDP.
Table 4c reverses the question of interest, and reports the like-
lihood that a democratic country will transition to autocracy at
time t, for different levels of non-tax revenue and tax reliance. Here
the pattern is somewhat different, with changes in tax reliance
having a larger impact than changes in non-tax revenue alone –
reflecting the enhanced importance of taxation, and the role of
stronger institutions in moderating the anti-democratic effects of
natural resource wealth. The results suggest that a democratic
country with tax reliance of 0.9 (e.g. the Philippines) and other
variables at their developing country means, has only about a
0.3% likelihood of transitioning to autocracy in any given year,
while an otherwise identical country with tax reliance of 0.2 (e.g.
Nigeria) has a 2.1% likelihood of becoming an autocracy – seven
times more likely. By contrast, going from non-tax revenue of 2%
of GDP to non-tax revenue of 20% of GDP only roughly doubles
the likelihood of a transition to autocracy. This suggests that it isweak tax systems that may be an important predictor of the weak-
ness of existing democracies.
While the results so far present relatively consistent support for
the existence of a political resource curse, Ross (2004) and
Andersen and Ross (2014) have argued for employing longer lags
on the explanatory variables in dynamic models, in order to more
accurately model the time period over which changes in revenue
may impact levels of democracy. Tables 5a and 5b correspondingly
report results using one, three and five year lags on the independent
variables for the Sys-GMM and the logit estimations, respectively.
The results are striking, as the key coefficients on tax_rel and
totnontax become almost universally larger with a longer lag, pre-
cisely as theory predicts. In addition, we find that while the coeffi-
cients on tottax become universally more positive with longer lags.
For the fixed effects logit this causes the coefficient on tottax to
become strongly positive and significant with a longer lag, while
in the random effects logit the surprisingly negative coefficient
on tottax from the earlier results disappears. These results are con-
sistent with longer lags better capturing the causal process of
interest.
Having presented detailed evidence of the existence of the
political resource curse, we conclude the core analysis by further
exploring the mechanisms underlying this relationship. The paper
began with the contention that the mixed results of earlier studies
can in part be explained by researchers’ frequent reliance on mea-
sures of resource income as the key explanatory variable, rather
than more theoretically appropriate measures of the composition
of government revenue. To demonstrate this point more systemati-
cally, Tables 6a and 6b directly compare the results of each of our
models when employing alternative independent variables from
the literature: (a) tax_rel, (b) tottax and totnontax, (c) total oil
income per capita (OilIncome), (d) total oil income as a share of
GDP (OilIncShare), and (e) total resource income as a share of
GDP (ResIncShare).38
The results are consistent in their broad message. For each of
our core models we find statistically significant evidence of the
political resource curse when relying on measures of the composi-
tion of government revenue, but find no statistically significant
evidence of the political resource curse when relying on the vari-
ous measures of resource income that have been employed else-
where in the literature.39 The latter always have the expected
Table 4c
Likelihood of transitions from democracy to autocracy.
Level of non-tax revenue as % of GDP
2% 5% 10% 20% 30%
Pr(Democracy) at t 0.0039 0.0043 0.0051 0.0071 0.0099
95% Confidence Interval (Upper) 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0055 0.0171
95% Confidence Interval (Lower) 0.0079 0.0084 0.0104 0.0197 0.0370
Level of Tax Reliance (Tax Revenue share of Total Gov’t Revenue)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.75 0.9
Pr(Democracy) at t 0.0213 0.0124 0.0072 0.0048 0.0032
95% Confidence Interval (Upper) 0.0170 0.0036 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004
95% Confidence Interval (Lower) 0.0594 0.0283 0.0039 0.0091 0.0067
Notes: Calculated based on Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4a, usingmargins command in stata, with regime = 0, civil_war = 0 and other variables set to their mean values excluding
OECD countries.
Table 5a
Effect of tax reliance, total tax and non-tax revenue on polity, using different lags.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sys-GMM two-step Sys-GMM two-step Sys-GMM two-step Sys-GMM two-step Sys-GMM two-step Sys-GMM two-step
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Lag Length k = 1 k = 3 k = 5 k = 1 k = 3 k = 5
Lk.Polity_s 0.8299*** 0.5597*** 0.4395*** 0.8402*** 0.5605*** 0.4515***
(0.0355) (0.0821) (0.1052) (0.0329) (0.0754) (0.0960)
Lk.Tax_Rel 10.7145** 16.0337** 15.3247*
(4.9556) (6.5186) (8.2139)
Lk.TotTax 0.1068 37.2723 32.4525
(10.6174) (28.9490) (34.6941)
Lk.totnotax 16.4406** 23.2742 34.2044**
(6.9217) (14.4920) (16.6445)
AR(1) 0.000 0.213 0.871 0.000 0.260 0.739
AR(2) 0.225 0.186 0.288 0.230 0.192 0.260
Hansen 0.127 0.282 0.277 0.250 0.368 0.160
N 2954 2681 2404 2954 2681 2404
N_g 155 153 152 155 153 152
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1), (4) use lags t-1; columns (2), (5) use lags t-3; columns (3), (6) use lags t-5.
Results include a lagged dependent variable and standard controls for lgdp, civil_war and growthpc.
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This offers strong support for the idea that the political resource
curse is, indeed, driven primarily by changes in the composition of
government revenue.40 It also raises a question: given a significant
correlation between resource income and non-tax revenue, what
explains the divergent results? That is, why does focusing on non-
tax revenue more precisely capture the relationship of interest than
focusing on resource income? This is a broader question than can be
fully answered here, and warrants further research. However, an ini-
tial exploration of the data suggests that many of the largest oil pro-
ducers are comparatively successful in translating resource income
into resource revenues – and are also most autocratic.41 By contrast,
a number of large mineral producers are relatively ineffective at
translating resource income in resource revenues – and are also
comparatively democratic.42 The latter also seems to apply, to a les-
ser extent, to some mid-sized oil producers.43 The greater ability of
countries to translate oil wealth into government revenues, in turn,
offers an explanation for growing evidence that the political resource
curse has, in fact, been primarily a political ‘‘oil curse”, with mineral
wealth having a more muted impact, if any (Ross, 2012, 2015).40 Earlier studies have sometimes reported positive results linking these measures
to democracy. Our interpretation, after careful analysis, is that earlier evidence is
comparatively sensitive to specific choices about variables, methods and sample,
whereas the results here when focusing on the composition of government revenue
are far more robust to a wide variety of specifications. Additional information is
available on request.
41 Examples include Angola, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates
42 Examples include Ghana, Guyana, Mongolia, Peru and Zambia.
43 Examples include Chad, Gabon, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.Finally, while Tables 6a and 6b report results using a one-year
lag on the independent variables, additional results using 3 and
5 years lags are presented in the Appendix, Tables A1a–d. The over-
all pattern of results is the same, with the exception that the coef-
ficients on the resource income variables become significant and
more comparable to the coefficients on the revenue variables in
the logit models with a five-year lag. One potential explanation,
consistent with the story told so far, is that the resource income
variables come to more closely resemble the resource revenue
variables with a longer lag. In new areas of resource production
firms often pay relatively limited revenues to government initially
– owing to short term tax relief, or extensive deductions for initial
capital investments – while over a longer time period government
revenues may begin to catch up to resource production.446. Robustness checks
The core results indicate that increased non-tax revenue, and
decreased tax reliance, are strongly associated with the likelihood
that a country will transition to, or remain, a democracy. However,
cross-country econometric results are notoriously sensitive, and
we correspondingly test the robustness of the results to changes
in control variables, the calibration of the Sys-GMM model, the
use of alternative dependent variables, reliance on central govern-
ment data only, the use of a longer (but less complete) time series
and the exclusion of different groups of countries. In all cases the44 And, indeed, the simple correlation between Resource Income and Non-Tax
Revenue is substantially higher when using a lagged version of Resource Income (0.62
vs. 0.50)
Table 5b
Tax reliance, total tax and non-tax revenue on regime using random and fixed effects logit models and different lags.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Logit – RE Logit – RE Logit – RE Logit – RE Logit – RE Logit – RE Logit – FE Logit – FE Logit – FE Logit – FE Logit – FE Logit – FE
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
k = 1 k = 3 k = 5 k = 1 k = 3 k = 5 k = 1 k = 3 k = 5 k = 1 k = 3 k = 5
Lk.Tax_Rel 1.1210 2.7481* 5.7188*** 7.5869** 4.5646* 8.1574***
(1.0663) (1.5038) (1.7969) (3.2035) (2.5892) (2.9519)
Lk.regimextaxrel 1.6562 2.8830 3.8521 0.0460 0.1386 0.6973
(1.9552) (2.1759) (2.4675) (2.4217) (2.0552) (2.4238)
Lk.TotTax 6.9451* 6.3527 1.8472 23.3852 31.0962** 55.4783***
(3.6907) (4.8319) (5.9654) (15.6515) (13.0215) (15.8134)
Lk.TotNonTax 11.6949** 14.7129*** 17.2846*** 14.9969 11.4022 16.4315
(5.3393) (5.5018) (6.2973) (10.1621) (8.1780) (10.4225)
Lk.regimextottax 20.6205** 22.0937*** 18.6939** 3.0542 5.5134 16.7679
(8.1548) (8.3163) (9.2724) (9.6120) (8.3539) (10.5746)
Lk.regimextotnontax 8.5020 9.4119 6.8268 0.8904 1.7791 6.0835
(7.6031) (7.1837) (8.8888) (9.5636) (7.6889) (8.2861)
Aggregate effects in democracies
b1 + b2 2.777217* 5.631105*** 9.5709*** 7.632901** 4.703199 7.460131**
(1.643015) (2.116353) (2.4695) (3.735864) (3.06411) (3.537407)
b1 + b3 13.67533* 15.74099** 20.54118** 20.33095 25.58278* 38.7104**
(7.223274) (7.548232) (8.688208) (16.72951) (13.5413) (15.96467)
b2 + b4 3.192879 5.300943 10.45787 15.88728 13.18135 22.51505*
5.435374) (5.115675) (6.996367) (11.05537) (9.054927) (12.76262)
Random Effects Model Descriptors
rl 0.0016111 2.329794 3.777649 0.00164 2.0214 3.375611
q 7.89e07 0.6226266 0.8127 8.24e07 0.55397 0.775965
N 2660 2321 1984 2660 2321 1984 468 367 298 468 367 298
N_g 181 178 176 181 178 176 29 26 24 29 26 24
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Columns (1), (4), (7), (10) use lags t-1; columns (2), (5), (8), (11) use lags t-3; columns (3), (6), (9), (12) use lags t-5. Results include a lagged dependent variable and standard controls for lgdp,
civil_war and growthpc. ‘‘b1 + b2” captures the joint significance of tax_rel and regime x taxrel, ‘‘b1 + b3” captures the joint significance of tottax and regime x tottax, and ‘‘b2 + b4” captures the joint significance of totnontax and regime
x totnontax.
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Table 6a
Comparing results using resource revenue or resource income as independent variables – panel methods.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sys-GMM two-
step
Sys-GMM two-
step
Sys-GMM two-
step
Sys-GMM two-
step
Sys-GMM two-
step
CCE-MG group w/
trend
CCE-MG group w/
trend
CCE-MG group w/
trend
CCE-MG group w/
trend
CCE-MG group w/
trend
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
k = 1 k = 1 k = 1 k = 1 k = 1 k = 0 k = 0 k = 0 k = 0 k = 0
L.Polity_s 0.8299*** 0.8374*** 0.8410*** 0.8442*** 0.8422***
(0.0355) (0.0331) (0.0378) (0.0374) (0.0366)
Lk.Tax_Rel 10.7145** 24.5997**
(4.9556) (9.9183)
Lk.TotTax 0.6663 57.3891**
(10.8254) (22.7934)
Lk. TotNonTax 14.4283** 100.8494*
(6.8737) (47.1368)
Lk.TotOilInc 0.0002 1.1706
(0.0002) (1.2024)
Lk. OilIncShare 1.6184 9325.9767
(1.2694) (6093.5250)
Lk. ResIncShare 0.9820
5519.4511
(1.3998) (5720.8841)
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.225 0.229 0.855 0.841 0.841
Hansen 0.127 0.834 0.149 0.153 0.151
N 2954 2954 2319 2319 2319 3022 3017 2316 2316 2316
N_g 155 155 154 154 154 150 150 150 150 150
Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Windmeijer standard errors in parentheses for GMM results. Results include standard controls lgdp, growthpc and civil_war.
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45 We exclude Regional democratic diffusion from the CCE-MG estimations, as the
CCE-MG estimator already accounts for cross-sectional correlations.
46 This is equivalent to a score of 2 or above (on a scale -10 to 10) on the polity2
variable as coded in the Polity IV dataset.
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detail in the Appendix and described briefly here.
Tables A2a and A2b report results adding our standard control
variables to our core models one by one, and then also adding con-
trols for population and regional democratic diffusion, both of
which are employed by Haber and Menaldo (2011). The results
prove consistently robust to different groups of control variables.45
Table A3 then tests the robustness of the results to slightly different
specifications of the Sys-GMM model, varying in the number of lags
employed, and whether control variables are treated as exogenous or
endogenous. Again the results prove robust to these alternatives.
Table A4 tests the results when employing data exclusively at the
central government level, instead of the preferred ICTD GRD dataset,
which employs general government data where available. The
results remain generally significant, but modestly weaker, which is
consistent with higher overall data quality revealing a stronger
and more consistent relationship.
Tables A5a–c test the robustness of our results to employing
alternative measures of democracy and accountability. We re-run
our Sys-GMM results, with multiple lag lengths, when employing
several other common measures: the Democracy measure from
the International Country Risk Guide (icrg_dem), the Freedom
House measure of democracy (fh_dem), and the Accountability
measure from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators
(wgi_acc). In turn, we re-run our logit results using an alternative
binary measure of democracy (regime_polity_60), constructed by
coding countries as democracies if they achieve a scaled polity
score of 60 out of 100 or above.46 These measures are all signifi-
cantly less desirable than the measures used in our core results.
Yet we nonetheless find statistically significant relationships, with
the expected sign, in more than half of the specifications, and span-
ning all four alternative measures of democracy and accountability,
thus offering further confidence in the overall results.
The core results reported so far employ a dataset that begins in
1990, as this is the period during which data coverage is most com-
plete, high quality and representative. That said, Tables A6a–f
explore the robustness of the results to employing a longer time
series. For the Sys-GMM and CCE-MG tests we expect the results
to grow gradually weaker as the time series is extended, for two
reasons: first, the declining quality of the data, and extent of data
coverage, and, second, evidence from Andersen and Ross (2014)
that the relationship between oil wealth and democracy has been
strongest since about 1985, as national governments have exer-
cised increasing control over resource extraction. This is precisely
what we find: All of the results remain statistically significant in
almost all cases, but grow progressively weaker. Meanwhile, the
logit results grow noticeably stronger with the longer time series,
most likely because this introduces a larger number of autocracy-
democracy transitions into the dataset.
Finally, Tables A7a–i report a battery of results exploring
robustness to excluding particular groups of countries. For each
of our estimation methods we begin by excluding the 11 members
of OPEC, and then an ‘expanded OPEC’ that includes recently with-
drawn Ecuador and Venezuela. We subsequently exclude, in turn,
countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region)
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), both as defined by
the World Bank. Both are home to significant resource producers,
while the latter has undergone major governance changes since
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, we also re-estimate our
results when excluding OECD countries, and when excluding
countries with populations below either 250,000 or 1,000,000.
47 Which is also replicated in a simple linear probability model, noted above.
48 While we do not report results using the ECM regressions employed by Haber and
Menaldo (2011), owing to their sensitivity with a shorter time series, the results are
consistent with the story here, with the revenue variables taking the expected sign,
but the coefficients generally statistically insignificant.
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sample, though the results are modestly weaker when we exclude
major groups of oil producers. This is to be expected, but also high-
lights the importance of the ICTD GRD data, which most dramati-
cally improves data coverage for resource rich states.
7. Discussion
Overall, we find strong evidence for the existence of a political
resource curse. Across the vast majority of the tests we find both
a statistically significant positive relationship between tax reliance
and democracy and a statistically significant negative relationship
between total non-tax revenue and democracy. At least one of the
two is significant in every model specification, and virtually every
robustness test, across each of the Sys-GMM, CCE-MG, RE logit and
FE logit estimations. Consistent with earlier arguments, the
strength of the results increases as the length of the lag on the rev-
enue variables increases. The broad results are robust to alterna-
tive control variables, employing only central government data,
alternative measures of democracy, the extension of the time ser-
ies and systematically excluding particular groups of countries.
Critically, themagnitude of the effects is large – but still plausible
– and comparable across several very different estimators. On bal-
ance the results suggest that moving from the resource wealth of
Senegal (average non-tax revenue of 1.5% of GDP, tax reliance of
0.9) to that of Nigeria (average non-tax revenue of 22% of GDP, tax
reliance of 0.22) is associatedwith a reduction in the level of democ-
racy of roughly 20 to 45 percentage points (dynamic panel esti-
mates), or, alternatively, is associated with a reduction in the
likelihood of a transition from autocracy to democracy of about
70% (logit estimates). In turn, increasing resource revenue to the
level of Angola (above 40% of GDP) is associated with a reduction
in the level of democracy of 40–60 percentage points, and a reduc-
tion the likelihood of a transition to democracy of about 85%. These
estimates suggest that resource wealth may be the strongest single
cross-country predictor of democratization identified by existing
research. They correspondingly imply the need for a focus on poten-
tial governance challenges in the growing number of low-income
countries that are, or will soon be, producing oil for international
markets.
In offering strong support for the existence of a political
resource curse, the results reported here call recent findings to
the contrary into question. Following the work of Andersen and
Ross (2014) and WPC (2014), our results suggest that the negative
findings reported by Haber and Menaldo (2011) are reflective of
their particular – and, in our view, problematic – choices about
time period, independent variables and estimators. By focusing
on a more contemporary time period, the composition of govern-
ment revenue and estimators that more clearly match the expected
relationship, we provide what we believe to be the most system-
atic evidence to date of the political resource curse.
In turn, our logit results speak directly to the recent work of
Morrison (2009, 2015) who, like us, tests the relationship between
tax revenue, non-tax revenue and democracy. In his tests Morrison
finds that non-tax revenue does not have an inherently anti-
democratic effect, but stabilizes both autocracies and democracies
alike. In turn, he argues that taxation is not democratizing, but
destabilizing, increasing the likelihood of regime transitions. The
arguments are provocative, and supported by case studies, but
are also open to question: they run counter to the majority of exist-
ing research and, as noted in Table 1, the quantitative results are
based on highly problematic earlier data.
Consistent with these concerns, our results appear to contradict
Morrison’s arguments. With respect to non-tax revenue, Mor-
rison’s argument predicts an anti-democratic effect in existing
autocracies, and a pro-democratic effect in existing democracies.By contrast, we find consistent evidence of an anti-democratic
effect of non-tax revenue in autocracies, and an insignificant or
anti-democratic effect of non-tax revenue in democracies. This
mirrors earlier arguments that the anti-democratic effects of
non-tax revenue are likely to be more muted in democracies,
owing to the countervailing effects of stronger institutions, checks
and balances (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006; Andersen &
Aslaksen, 2013; Wiens et al., 2014).
With respect to tax revenue, Morrison predicts a pro-
democratic effect of taxation in autocracies, and an anti-
democratic effect in existing democracies. By contrast, we find
weak support for a pro-democratic effect in autocracies, and no
support at all for an anti-democratic effect in democracies. In fact,
we find the opposite: A substantively large positive effect of taxa-
tion on democracy in existing democracies in our random-effects
logit models.47 Again, this is consistent with more conventional
arguments in the existing case-study literature, which suggest that
democratic institutions may amplify the pro-democratic potential
of taxation by providing greater potential for popular collective
action and ‘‘tax bargaining” (Levi, 1988; Prichard, 2015).
While the results thus offer support for the existence of a politi-
cal resource curse, the parallel goal of this paper has been to shed
light on the mechanisms underpinning this relationship. We find
that, across multiple alternative estimators, the results are consis-
tently larger and more significant when employing measures of
the composition of government revenue, as opposed to more com-
mon measures of resource income. This has several implications.
First, it helps to explain why oil wealth has been more consistently
linked to autocracy than resource wealth from mining: mineral
wealth generally produces significantly less government revenue
per unit value of production, particularly in low-income countries.
Second, it increases our understanding of the likely causes of the
resource curse by focusing attention on mechanisms that occur
via government revenue – most notably, expanded public spending
and patronage, expanded security spending, expanded scope for the
enrichment and empowerment of state elites and reduced reliance
on the taxation of citizens. Most broadly, it argues for future
research that focuses on government revenue, rather than the more
common focus on resource incomemore broadly. There continue to
be plausible arguments for focus on resource income: data contin-
ues to havemore complete coverage, while it has so far provenmore
amenable to locating sources of exogenous variation over time.
However, with improvements in the coverage and quality of rev-
enue data the potential advantages of relying on resource income
data are, in our view, outweighed by the benefits of employing rev-
enue data thatmore preciselymatches the theory underpinning the
political resource curse.
Our results also speak to two ongoing debates in the literature.
First, is the political resource curse largely about long-term effects
in levels or about short-term changes (Ross, 2015)? By employing a
variety of econometric estimation techniques side by side we gain
leverage over this question, and the pattern of results supports an
understanding of the political resource curse as a longer-term rela-
tionship. All of the results are stronger using longer lags on the
independent variables and when employing Sys-GMM, CCE-MG
and logit models that incorporate information both on within
country variation over time and cross-country differences in levels.
By contrast, models that focus exclusively on short-term within
country variation – Fixed Effects, Diff-GMM48 – yield results that
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fixed-effects logit results remain significant.
Second, is the resource curse best captured by relating the com-
position government revenue to levels of democracy, or to the like-
lihood of transitions between autocracy and democracy (Wiens
et al., 2014)? We find significant support for both versions of the
question. That said, we generally favor a focus on transitions. By
systematically distinguishing the effects of changes in the compo-
sition of revenue between autocracies and democracies these mod-
els offer additional nuance. As importantly, they deal most
effectively and explicitly with the fact that most major resource
producers were autocracies prior to becoming resource producers,
and that resource wealth has correspondingly blocked transitions,
rather than reducing the level of democracy, in many cases. And,
indeed, our results using dynamic logit models remain robust in
both random and fixed-effects specifications.
Finally, a note is warranted on the comparatively ambiguous
results relating total tax revenue to democracy. The most common
reading of theory predicts that tax revenue should be associated
with higher levels of democracy, with increases in taxation tempo-
rally preceding increases in democracy (e.g. Ross, 2004). However,
while some of our results show this relationship, the bulk of our
results for tottax are insignificant. While our results may thus be
read as a repudiation of theory, recent case study research suggests
that it may, in fact, be comparatively simplistic readings of theory
that are flawed – with the mixed quantitative results here reflect-
ing these limitations.
Prichard (2015) presents evidence that the impact of increased
taxation on accountability tends to be comparatively long term,
while this relationship may not follow a straightforward sequence;
increased taxation may precede accountability, but there may
equally be short-term decreases in taxation that subsequently gen-
erate pressure for improvements in accountability (see also
Prichard, 2016b). In turn, he suggests that such comparatively
long-term and indirect processes will be more common in more
restrictive political environments. Econometrically, this research
predicts (i) a positive long-term relationship between taxation
and democracy, but (ii) significant difficulty in identifying a rela-
tionship econometrically over the short-term using within-
country estimators, and (iii) clearer results for more democratic
states, where ‘‘tax bargaining” is more likely to be linear and
immediate. The results presented here are consistent with these
predictions: Our long-term estimators (Pooled OLS and CCE-MG)
offer strong support for a positive relationship between taxation
and accountability, all of the results are more positive (though
often still insignificant) with longer lags, and we find generally
stronger evidence for a tax-democracy link in existing democra-
cies. While we do not view the results here as strong evidence in
favor of a tax-democracy link, they do seem to offer support for a
more nuanced reading of the causal processes potentially under-
pinning any such relationship.8. Conclusions
The premise of this paper is that the expanding econometric lit-
erature on the political resource curse has suffered from a reliance
on explanatory variables that only imperfectly match the theoreti-
cal propositions of interest, due to stark weaknesses in
cross-country government revenue data. As with many areas of
development research, the most useful strategy for generating
improved results thus lies not in more complex methods, or more
complex hypotheses, tested using existing data. Instead, we make
more progress by improving the quality of underlying data, allow-
ing us to specify more theoretically precise propositions, which we
then subject to a variety of complementary econometric tests. Bydoing so we find what we believe to be the most robust available
evidence of the existence of a political resource curse, while shed-
ding new light on the causal mechanisms underlying this
relationship.9. Conflict of Interest
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